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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KRISTE A. PITKIN,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case no. 14588
vs.
PRESTON'S INCORPORATED and
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendants and
Respondents,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
The issues in the case at bar are necessarily those
of law and fact.

The question being whether the injury suffered

by Appellant falls within the perimeters of the Workman's Compensa
tion Statute, Utah Code Annotated 35-1-44, as being an accidental
injury suffered in the course of employment.
Respondent correctly states the Supreme Court's duty
to determine the correctness of the Industrial Commissions's
application of the law to the instant fact pattern.

However,

Respondent argues factual issues in his brief and diminishes
the true purnose of this inquest - to review the law as applied
to the facts.
First, Respondent treats the issue of whether the
Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously by citing
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pages of transcript in an attempt to demonstrate the alleged
lack of credibility of Appellant.

He thus fails to focus on

the real issues:
1.

Whether the Commission ever considered other

competent, substantialf and uncontroverted testimony, and
2.

Whether the Commission correctly weighed

the contradictory testimony of Patrick Preston against the corrabor
ated testimony of Appellant.

It follows from a careful reading

of the record that there is no justification for finding that
the Commission correctly weighed the evidence.
Contrary to Defendant's argument, Appellant informed
at least two employees (Heather Hardy and Earl Halverson) and
the owner of Preston's Inc. (Patrick Preston) of her injury.
Heather Hardy's testimony places the accidental injury during
the last week of August (T.R. 93,70). Yet, her testimony was
never mentioned in Defendant's findings of fact. Heather also
verified the fact that Earl Halverson had been informed of the
injury.

This testimony was never mentioned either.
More conspicuous is the absence of any mention of

Patrick Preston's contradictory and evasive testimony.

For

example, on examination, he contradicted himself in regard to
Appellant's duties (T.R. 85-86).

However, his statements regardin<

the frequency of his employee's complaining about backaches
is lucid.
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MR. PRESTON; Now have you ever had a complaint from he]
concerning any backaches, or any such similar problem?
A. Nearly since the day we took over I have
received complaints about backaches, which I do not
think unusual.
MR. PRESTON: Why?
A. I have never worked anyplace, been involved
with people, when at some time they haven't complained
about backaches. Lower back pain (T.R. 82 1. 14-25,
see also T.R. 83 1 1-19)
This testimony points to the absurdity of predicating
a theory of "prior back problems" or ordinary backaches.
On redirect, Respondent was unsure if Appellant had
ever complained of backaches prior to her injury stating that
he, himself, had suffered backaches several times and didn't
want to say (T.R. 94 1. 20-25).

The Commission failed to weigh

the difference between mundane employee complaints of backaches
due to weariness and the serious complaint by Appellant of lower
back and sciatic pain. In fact, there is no substantial, competent
evidence to show that an industrial accident did not occur.
Secondly, the notice of claim was given to the Industria
Commission within the year as required by statute.

That a conver-

sation between employer and employee does not fall within the
statute is totally irrelevant, especially since no forms nor
Workman Compensation information as well as insurance were even
furnished by Respondent.

Appellent's amended notice was uncontro-

vertibly and properly filed on January 31, 1974 as acknowledged
on page two of Respondent's brief and precluded such an unfounded
argument.
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Finally, to satisfy the Workman's Compensation statute,
an injury must be accidental and happen in the course of empioymenl
The accidental nature of Appellant's injury is established under
authority of Fenton v. Thorley and its progeny.

The burden

of proving an accident in the course of employment is met under
authority of Baker.

Respondent seeks to distinguish Baker by

alleging that the evidence is not substantialr competent, or
corraborated. Appellant submits that, as outlined above, the
testimony of Appellant is characterized as such and is, in additio
uncontroverted by any substantial evidence on Respondent's part.
For example, Respondent neither established another cause for
Appellant's injury, nor established the most remote relivancy
of Appellant's fall in November, 1974, nor demonstrated that
Appellant's corraborated testimony was conclusively unreliable.
The only question squarely presented by the case is
whether Appellant's injury occurred in the course of employment.
The law does not require that a victim of internal failure be
charged with precise knowledge of his condition; indefinite
statements concerning the cause of an injury are not held to
defeat recovery.

Baker, at 614. From the above statement of

law and the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact that
it was Appellant's lifting which significantly contributed to
the injury, it is clear that her injury was an industrial accidenunder the statute.
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There being substantial evidence to support a finding
for Appellant, the Commission acted arbitrarily in assigning
more weight to the insubstantial evidence presented by Respondent
That evidence demonstrates only that Respondent was not in compli
with the law which requires employers to carry insurance or
to be self-insurers.

Utah Code Annotated 35-1-44.

For the reasons stated above, the Order of the Industrie
Commission should be reversed and compensation awarded to Appellai
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Gordon J. Low
Attorney for Appellant
175 East First North
Logan, UT 84321

I hereby certify that I mailed, postpaid, copies of
the foregoing brief of Appellant to the Industrial Commission
of Utah, to George W. Preston, Attorney for Defendant, this
day of August, 1976.
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